Supplementary Appendix for "**The Politics of Accountability in Supreme Court Nominations: Voter Recall and Assessment of Senator Votes on Nominees**"

Political Science Research Methods
Leeann Bass, Charles Cameron and Jonathan Kastellec
January 3rd, 2022

A Appendix

In this appendix we provide additional coding details on the data used in the article, as well as supplemental and robustness analyses.

A.1 Measuring newspaper coverage

In Figure 2 in the article, we present newspaper coverage on Supreme Court nominees between 1930 and 2018. We collected the universe of "straight news" reporting on each nominee using the *Los Angeles Times* and the *New York Times*. Specifically, we collected the full text of these articles from ProQuest, Factiva, and the *New York Times* online archive, converting articles published before 1970 for the *New York Times* and before 1985 for the *Los Angeles Times* to digital text using optical character recognition software. To account for newspapers' one-day lag in coverage of events, we define the nomination period as spanning from the day before the announcement of the nominee to the day after the nomination ended (via a confirmation vote in the Senate, withdrawal, or expiration). To concentrate on articles in which the nomination was a substantial focus of the story, we excluded stories which mentioned the nominee's last name fewer than three times. In addition, for each paper, we excluded editorials and op-eds.

A.2 Measuring political engagement and demographics

We use the following variables to measure the political engagement of the respondents in the 1992 Senate Election Study:

- **Education** We divide education levels into four groups: 1=less than high school, 2=high school graduate, 3=some college, 4=college graduate.
- **Ideological extremity** The survey asked respondents a standard 7-point ideology question, ranging from very liberal to very conservative. We center this index at zero and take the absolute value, such that higher values indicate more extreme self-placement.
- **Media consumption** We construct an index based on the following variables:
  - Days in the past week spent watching television.
  - Days in the past week having read a newspaper.

- How many stories did you read, see or hear regarding the campaign in this state for the U.S. Senate?

We aggregate these responses, then create a 4-point scale based on the quartiles of this aggregate distribution.

- **Partisan Identification** An "independent" is anyone who identifies as such; a partisan is anyone else (including leaners).
- **Political attention** The survey asked: "Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested?" We code this variable from 1 to 3, by increasing attention.
- **Political knowledge** The ASES asked respondents to identify the job or political office of (then) Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Speaker of the House Tom Foley, Vice President Dan Quayle, and Vice President-elect Al Gore. From these responses, we build an index of knowledge from zero to four (pooling "don't knows" with incorrect responses).
- **Voted** Did the respondent vote in the 1992 presidential election (based on self-reporting)?

We use the following variables to measure political engagement of the respondents in the 2009 and 2010 CCES:

- **Education** Same as above.
- **Ideological extremity** Same as above.
- **Political Knowledge**: Coded 0 if the respondent could not correctly identify the party in control of the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate; 1 if the respondent correctly identified the party in control of either the House or Senate; 2 if the respondent correctly identified the party in control of both chambers (the Democrats were in control of both chambers in 2009 and 2010).
- **Partisan Identification** Same as above.
- **News interest** The survey asked: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs ...?" We code answers as follows:
  - Hardly at all=1
  - Only now and then=2
  - Some of the time=3
  - Most of the time=4
- **Voted** Did the respondent vote in the 2008 presidential election (based on self-reporting)?

Variable	-1	0	1
Age 18-29	0.10	0.14	0.11
Age 30–44	0.19	0.23	0.20
Age 45–64	0.49	0.43	0.49
Age 65+	0.21	0.20	0.21
White	0.81	0.77	0.79
Black	0.11	0.13	0.13
Hispanic	0.08	0.10	0.08
Less than HS educ.	0.03	0.04	0.02
HS grad	0.24	0.32	0.21
Some college	0.37	0.36	0.36
College grad	0.36	0.28	0.41
Engagement (factor score)	0.00	-0.28	0.01
Democrat	0.34	0.46	0.56
Independent	0.13	0.15	0.10
Republican	0.54	0.40	0.34

Table A-1: *Balance test for actual nominee agreement in the Sotomayor and Kagan data. See text for details*

Finally, we use the following codings for the demographic variables. We break race down into Black, Hispanic, and white/other. We break age down into four age groups (18–29, 30–44, 45–64, and 65+). We break education into four education groups (less than a high school education, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate). Finally, female is coded 1 for females, 0 for males.

A.3 Assessing exogeneity

In this section we assess the potential threat to the exogeneity assumption for our IV analyses. As noted in the text, we focus only on the Sotomayor and Kagan results, since the Thomas results in the IV regressions are not significant.

A.3.1 Covariate balance

First, we follow the advice of Angrist and Pischke (2014, 138) and "check independence by checking covariate balance with the instrument switched on and off, as in a randomized trial." Recall that our instrument, "actual nominee agreement" is trichotomous, coded -1 if it the respondent's preference is opposite to the senator's vote, 0 if if the respondent does not have an opinion on the nominee or does not express an interest, and +1 if the respondent's preference agrees with the senator's vote.

Table A-1 depicts the mean rates of each covariate in the Sotomayor/Kagan data, across the three levels of actual nominee agreement. The table reveals generally good balance among the demographic variables; those in the 0 level are likely to have lower levels of education and be somewhat younger, but the differences here are not dramatic.

We do, however, see large differences with respect to political engagement and partisanship. Beginning with the former, we see that respondents who score 0 on actual agreement show much lower engagement than those who score either -1 or 1. This is perhaps not surprising, since those with less engagement are less likely to have opinions on Supreme Court nominees. We tested whether this imbalance was possibly affecting our results by re-running the IV models for Sotomayor and Kagan in Table 6, this time excluding all the respondents who scored zero on actual agreement. All the coefficients on perceived nominee agreement remained substantively and significantly the same.

Turning to partisanship, Table A-1 shows that those who scored 1 on actual agreement were much more likely to be Democrats and those who scored -1 were more likely to be Republicans. To assess the possible effect of this imbalance, we re-ran all the models in Table 6 separately for Democrats and Republicans (see section A.6.3 below). All the results remain largely the same, except the coefficient on actual party agreement in the vote choice regression for Democrats loses statistical significance. (This could be due simply to a smaller sample size, as the samples for which we can use vote choice as a dependent variable are much smaller compared to approval).

A.3.2 Sensitivity analysis

We follow the lead of Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki (2021*b*, 19) and implement the method developed by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) and Cinelli, Ferwerda and Hazlett (2020) to test how sensitive the IV results are to possible confounding. As summarized by Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki (2021*b*, 19):

> It is well-known that variables that are both correlated with the outcome and

> correlated with the treatment variable can induce omitted variable bias. Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) outline a method that parameterizes the magnitude of the bias by the partial R^2 of the two relationships and generates benchmarks of the size of the bias. Their method extends classic sensitivity analyses but in a more readily interpretable way, because the partial R^2 is invariant to the unit of measurement and more easily interpretable.

We implement this method as follows. The exogeneity condition applies to both the first stage regressions and the reduced form. For both, we apply sensitivity analyses to the Sotomayor and Kagan regressions, examining approval and vote separately as dependent variables. The general thrust of the analyses is to ask how much the true relationship between between the predictor of interest and outcome would have to be confounded by an unobserved variable to make the estimated coefficient go to zero. Accordingly, understanding the degree of confounding requires a benchmark variable that is employed in the key regressions. We choose two. Like Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki (2021*b*), we use "actual party agreement," labeled "Copartisan" in the plots below for convenience. We also use "actual ideological agreement," labeled "Coideology" in the plots below for convenience.

We begin with the first stage regressions. Figure A-1 shows the results of the sensitivity analyses for the first stage. The top row shows the results using approval as the dependent variable, while the bottom row shows the results using vote choice as the dependent variable. (Recall that the structure of the first stage does not depend on the outcome variable; however, because the sample sizes are different, we perform separate analyses based on the data used in the approval regressions and the data used in the vote choice regressions.) The left column employs Copartisan as a benchmark, while the right column employs Coideology as a benchmark.

The way to interpret the graphs is as follows. The triangle marked "Unadjusted" depicts the actual estimated coefficient from the first stage regressions; e.g. in the top-left panel, a one-unit shift in actual nominee agreement predicts a .4 shift in perceived nominee agreement. This estimate implicitly assumes no confounding. The contour lines show how the value of the coefficient would change based on unobserved confounding with either the outcome variable



Figure A-1: *Sensitivity analyses for first stage regressions, for Sotomayor and Kagan. See text for details.*

(e.g. the dependent variable) on the vertical axis, or the "treatment" (which here is actual nominee agreement) on the horizontal axis. The red (dashed) contour line indicates the degree of confounding that would have to occur for the estimated relationship to go to zero. Finally, the red triangles give specific estimates of the relationship, under the specified level of confounding. For example, in the top-left plot in Figure A-1, if there were an unobserved confounded that was equal in size to the effect of Copartisanship, the estimated effect of actual nominee agreement on perceptions would decrease to .33—this would still be well away from zero, however. (In other words, if a triangle is "below" the red contour line, that



Figure A-2: *Sensitivity analyses for reduced form (outcome) regressions, for Sotomayor and Kagan. See text for details.*

means the treatment effect survives under the given degree of confounding; if it is above, it does not.)

Overall, the results in Figure A-1 show that the first stage results are not sensitive to possible confounding. The left plots show that an unobserved confounder would have to be more than twice the effect of copartisanship to make the first stage results go to zero, while the right plots show an unobserved confounder would have to have 10 times the effect of Coideology.

Figure A-2 shows the results of the sensitivity analyses for the reduced form regressions.

Recall here that the outcome is voter assessment of senators, while the "treatment" is actual nominee agreement. Again the top row shows the results from the approval regressions, while the bottom row shows the results from the vote choice regressions. The left column employs Copartisan as a benchmark, while the right column employs Coideology as a benchmark. The figure shows that the outcome results are more sensitive to possible confounding than the first stage results. Still, the amount of omitted variable bias that would have to occur is still quite sizable.

Beginning with the approval regressions, the top row in A-2 shows that even with an unobserved confounder as large as the effect of Copartisanship and five times the effect of Coideology, the estimated relationship between actual nominee agreement and approval would still be positive. Given the overall importance of partisanship in public opinion, it's difficult to imagine what such a confounder would be.

When we turn to vote choice, we find that a confounder with half the effect size of Copartisanship would bring the relationship between actual nominee agreement and vote choice to zero. Thus, the relationship between actual nominee agreement and vote choice is more sensitive to possible confounding. However, it's important to note that in the Kagan vote choice models (see Table 6 in the article), the effect of Actual Party Agreement is very large; the coefficient is .40, compared to about .20 in the approval models. Thus, using Copartisanship as a benchmark here sets a very high bar. If instead we use Coideology (which as a coefficient of .13 — see Model (6) in Appendix Table A-3, an unobserved confounder could still be five times as large as the effect of Coideology and the relationship between actual nominee agreement and vote choice would survive.

Summary of exogeneity As with any observational study lacking quasi-random assignment, achieving complete exogeneity is not possible. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that our IV analyses satisfy the exogeneity condition. However, the combination of the covariate balance assessments and sensitivity analyses (along with the survey experiment

	Outcome: Approval			Outcome: Vote Choice		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) RF	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) RF
Perceived nominee agreement	0.111*	0.070		0.061*	0.601	
	(0.010)	(0.067)		(0.019)	(0.632)	
Perceived party agreement	0.025	0.115*		0.229*	0.315*	
	(0.014)	(0.043)		(0.025)	(0.099)	
Actual nominee agreement			0.015			0.045*
			(0.009)			(0.018)
Actual party agreement			0.031*			0.160*
			(0.009)			(0.018)
High school graduate	-0.016	-0.014	-0.017	-0.008	-0.024	-0.006
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.078)	(0.113)	(0.077)
Some college	0.007	0.011	0.009	-0.034	-0.042	-0.035
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.079)	(0.113)	(0.079)
College graduate	-0.020	-0.013	-0.007	-0.086	-0.148	-0.075
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.083)	(0.136)	(0.082)
Female	0.047*	0.045*	0.047*	-0.032	-0.004	-0.029
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.060)	(0.033)
Hispanic	-0.002	0.009	0.005	0.120	0.111	0.091
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.070)
White/Other Race	-0.050	-0.053	-0.049	-0.051	-0.040	-0.033
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.135)	(0.091)
Age 30-44	-0.008	-0.011	-0.015	0.013	0.019	-0.002
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.048)
Age 35-64	0.023	0.024	0.017	0.048	0.132	0.020
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.127)	(0.050)
Age 65+	0.011	0.013	-0.001	0.051	0.105	0.019
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.109)	(0.059)
Democrat	0.062	0.048	0.071	0.027	-0.035	0.052
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.070)	(0.121)	(0.070)
Republican	0.058	0.078	0.069	0.039	-0.054	0.050
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.149)	(0.069)
Political engagement	-0.018*	-0.020*	-0.021*	0.047*	0.052	0.043*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.019)
Ideological agreement	0.066*	0.048	0.054*	0.285*	0.229*	0.257*
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.048)
N	2,561	2,561	2,561	785	785	785
R^2	0.072	–	0.023	0.190	–	0.193

Table A-2: *Full regression results for Thomas. The table reproduces the key regression results while adding control variables.*

conducted by Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki (2021*a*)—see footnote 16 in the article) give us considerable confidence that the IV results for Sotomayor and Kagan satisfy exogeneity.

A.4 Full regression results

Table A-2 presents the full first-stage and second-stage results (using both OLS and IV) for Thomas, while Table A-3 presents the same for Sotomayor and Kagan.

	Outcome: Approval			Outcome: Vote Choice		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) RF	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) RF
Perceived nominee agreement	0.164*	0.233*		0.133*	0.130*	
	(0.007)	(0.015)		(0.016)	(0.033)	
Perceived party agreement	0.205*	0.201*		0.305*	0.388*	
	(0.007)	(0.011)		(0.017)	(0.027)	
Actual nominee agreement			0.115*			0.109*
			(0.006)			(0.017)
Actual party agreement			0.169*			0.326*
			(0.007)			(0.019)
High school graduate	-0.012	-0.003	-0.026	-0.078	-0.062	-0.032
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.079)
Some college	-0.042	-0.032	-0.059	-0.037	-0.018	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.080)
College graduate	-0.020	-0.010	-0.039	-0.053	-0.028	-0.012
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.080)
Female	0.035*	0.034*	0.030*	0.020	0.015	0.018
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Hispanic	0.042*	0.044*	0.056*	-0.019	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.023)
White/Other Race	0.051*	0.053*	0.046*	0.013	0.008	0.026
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Age 30-44	-0.059*	-0.059*	-0.062*	-0.039	-0.029	-0.054
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.038)
Age 35-64	-0.035*	-0.035*	-0.044*	-0.016	0.002	-0.019
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Age 65+	-0.029	-0.027	-0.033	-0.044	-0.022	-0.044
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.036)
Democrat	0.083*	0.065*	0.092*	0.148*	0.122*	0.154*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Republican	0.073*	0.075*	0.063*	0.137*	0.140*	0.144*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Political engagement	-0.004	-0.008	0.002	0.007	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Ideological agreement	0.175*	0.115*	0.210*	0.168*	0.057	0.132*
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.026)
N	13,129	13,129	13,366	1,574	1,574	1,604
R^2	0.442	–	0.392	0.754	–	0.792

Table A-3: *Full regression results for Sotomayor and Kagan. The table reproduces the key regression results while adding control variables.*

A.5 Regression results for other issues

Table A-4 presents the results of instrumental variable regressions (with controls) estimating the effect of perceived agreement with other issues on voters' approval of their senators (top panel) and on vote choice (bottom panel). The coefficients and confidence intervals graphed in Figure 7 in the article are based on these models. (Note that the results in these models again do not change if we cluster on senator rather than respondent.)

	DV: Approval					
	(1) ACA	(2) CHIP	(3) Dodd-Frank	(4) Don't Ask, Don't Tell	(5) Lilly Ledbetter	(6) Stimulus
Perceived issue agreement	0.21*	0.10*	0.08*	0.18*	0.09*	0.19*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Perceived party agreement	0.17*	0.26*	0.28*	0.26*	0.27*	0.20*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
N	8,815	4,282	8,777	8,768	4,272	13,120
	DV: Vote Choice					
Perceived issue agreement	0.19*	–	0.04*	0.11*	–	0.19*
	(0.04)	–	(0.02)	(0.04)	–	(0.03)
Perceived party agreement	0.32*	–	0.44*	0.42*	–	0.34*
	(0.03)	–	(0.02)	(0.02)	–	(0.03)
N	1,581	–	1,575	1,560	–	1,572

Table A-4: *IV regressions evaluating whether perceptions about votes on other issues affect evaluation of senators. All models include controls (education, gender, race, age, partisanship, and factor score of political engagement); standard errors are clustered on respondent.* $^{*}p<0.05$.

A.6 Robustness analyses

In this subsection we present a series of robustness results that are referenced at various points in the article.

A.6.1 Additional correct recall analysis

In this section we report an additional test of the recall results presented in Section 3.1 of the paper. Here we consider a slightly more nuanced hypothetical. Suppose instead that voters were making slightly more educated guesses by metaphorically flipping a weighted coin, where the weights were given by the proportion of yes votes in the Senate. The idea here is that voters may have a sense of whether a justice was confirmed either narrowly or more easily, and may condition their guess on this knowledge.[1]

To test this proposition, we took the actual proportion of yes votes for each nominee. Thomas was confirmed 52-48 (.52); Sotomayor 68-31 (.69) and Kagan 67-33 (.67). Then, for each respondent, we generated two (independent) guesses of their senators' votes by taking a single draw from a binomial distribution with the success paramater taking on the respective vote share. We then created a hypothetical correct recall index by taking the sum of these two variables.

The results are presented in Table A-5. (Because we are comparing the results to a counter-factual involving guessing, we take the approach we used in Section 3.1 and exclude respondents who are not willing to offer an opinon when they don't have one.) Table A-5 shows that the actual distributions of recall is superior to what we observe under this more nuanced form of guessing. This is particularly the case for Sotomayor and Kagan.

A.6.2 Clustering on senator

We report the results of regression analyses in the article based on the long data in which respondents appear in multiple observations (once for each of their senators), except that

[1] We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this counterfactual.

Distribution of Index of Correct Responses				
	Thomas		**Sotomayor/Kagan**	
	Actual Index	Counterfactual	Actual Index	Counterfactual
Recall neither	25%	24%	2%	21%
Recall one	36%	51%	10%	47%
Recall both	39%	26%	89%	32%

Table A-5: *Measuring voter recall of senator votes under the hypothetical distribution where voters make guesses based on the observed proportion of yes votes in the Senate. The actual index reports the distribution of the recall index after excluding respondents who are not willing to offer an opinon when they don't have one.*

standard errors are clustered on senators rather than respondents. Table A-6 replicates the results in Table 3; Table A-7 replicates Table 4; and Table A-8 replicates Table 6. For all of the models, statistical significance is unchanged, and thus our key results hold regardless of the choice of clustering.

	Thomas			
	DV: Perceived Thomas agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Actual nominee agreement	0.10*	0.12*	0.02*	0.03*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement	0.04*	0.04*	0.21*	0.21*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	5,518	3,666	5,518	3,666
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.13	0.18
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Sotomayor and Kagan			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
Actual nominee agreement	0.42*	0.40*	0.10*	0.08*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement.	0.16*	0.10*	0.70*	0.67*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	15,769	14,456	130,388	14,385
R^2	0.47	0.50	0.67	0.68
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-6: *OLS regressions of voters' perceptions of nominee vote and party of senator, with standard errors clustered on senators. In each model the dependent variable is perceived nominee agreement. For models (2) and (4), control variables include: education, gender, race, age, partisanship, actual ideological agreement, and the factor score of political engagement based on the variables in Figures 4 and 5. *$p<0.05$.*

	Approval		Vote choice	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Thomas			
Actual nominee agreement	0.01	0.02	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Actual party agreement	0.04*	0.03*	0.19*	0.16*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	3,674	2,561	1,036	785
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.19
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Sotomayor and Kagan		***Kagan***	
Actual nominee aggreement	0.14*	0.12*	0.13*	0.11*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Actual party agreement	0.22*	0.17*	0.35*	0.33*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N	120,662	13,366	17,518	1604
R^2	0.38	0.39	0.78	0.79
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-7: *OLS regression models of reduced form of actual agreement versus evaluation of senators, with standard errors clustered on senators. The dependent variable in* ***Columns (1)-(2)****, whether respondents approve of their senators, while* ***Columns (3)-(4)*** *employ vote choice as the dependent variable. Models with control variables include: education, gender, race, age, partisanship, and the factor score of political engagement based on the variables in Figures 4 and 5.* $^*p<0.05$.

	Thomas							
	IV Regressions				***OLS Regressions***			
	Approval		**Vote choice**		**Approval**		**Vote choice**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Perceived nominee agreement	0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.64 (1.13)	0.60 (1.20)	0.11* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)
Perceived party agreement	0.15* (0.06)	0.12 (0.04)	0.43* (0.07)	0.31* (0.13)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.26* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3,674	2,561	1,036	785	3,674	2,561	1,036	785
R^2	–	–	–	–	0.05	0.07	0.13	0.19
F-stat (nominee)	30*	26*	2	2	–	–	–	–
F-stat (party)	270*	159*	337*	243*	–	–	–	–
	Sotomayor and Kagan							
	IV Regressions				***OLS Regressions***			
	Approval		**Vote choice (Kagan)**		**Approval**		**Vote choice (Kagan)**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Perceived nominee agreement	0.25* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.14* (0.04)	0.13* (0.05)	0.19* (0.01)	0.16* (0.01)	0.16* (0.01)	0.13* (0.02)
Perceived party agreement	0.23* (0.01)	0.20* (0.01)	0.40* (0.03)	0.39* (0.03)	0.24* (0.01)	0.21* (0.01)	0.34* (0.01)	0.31* (0.01)
N	14,147	13,129	1,670	1,574	14,322	13,129	1,671	1,574
R^2	–	–	–	–	0.41	0.44	0.73	0.75
F-stat (nominee)	5,045*	2,229*	1,700*	564*	–	–	–	–
F-stat (party)	13,148.4 *	5,025*	5,951.5*	1,484*	–	–	–	–

Table A-8: *Regression models evaluating whether perceptions about nominee votes affect evaluation of senators, with standard errors clustered on senators. The first four models present instrumental variables models, while the last four models present OLS regressions. For* ***Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6)****, the dependent variable is whether respondents approve of their senators on perceived nominee and party agreement;. For* ***Columns (3), (4), (7), (8)****, the dependent variable is whether respondents voted to re-elect their incumbent senator. Models with control variables include: education, gender, race, age, partisanship, and the factor score of political engagement based on the variables in Figures 4 and 5. The F-statistics in the IV regressions are tests of whether actual nominee and party agreement is a sufficiently strong predictor of perceived nominee and party agreement, respectively.* $^*p<0.05$.

A.6.3 Partisan identification

For all of the regression analyses, we report separate results for Democrats and Republicans.

- Tables A-9 and A-10 replicate Table 2 for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.
- Tables A-11 and A-12 replicate Table 3 for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.
- Tables A-13 and A-14 replicate Table 4 for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.
- Tables A-15 and A-16 replicate Table 6 for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.

The results are generally symmetrical across Democrats and Republicans. There are a couple exceptions to note.

- The relationship between actual nominee agreement and perceived nominee agreement is stronger for Republicans than Democrats in the Sotomayor and Kagan data (cf. Tables A-9 and A-10).
- As noted above, in the IV regressions, when we look at the Democrats-only models where vote choice is the dependent variable (see Table A-15), except the coefficient on actual party agreement in the vote choice regression for Democrats loses statistical significance, whereas it remains positive for Republicans.

The question of partisan asymmetries in nomination politics is an important one. Badas and Simas (2020) provide some suggestive evidence that Republican voters may care more about Supreme Court nominations than Democratic voters. Unfortunately, our data are not very well suited to answer this question, since both of our nominees from the twenty-first century were appointed by a Democrat; ideally one would want to look across presidents from different parties, holding constant as many features of the broader nomination and confirmation environment as possible.

	Thomas		Sotomayor/Kagan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political engagement	0.13*	0.14*	0.46*	0.38*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	0.46*	0.47*	0.51*	0.52*
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	882	872	3,312	3,312
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.26	0.31

Table A-9: *OLS models of voter recall as a function of political engagement, Democrats only. In each model, the dependent variable is the index of recall* $^*p<0.05$.

	Thomas		Sotomayor/Kagan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political engagement	0.12*	0.14*	0.51*	0.44*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.46*	0.49*	0.55*	0.57*
	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	822	812	3,182	3,182
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.19	0.22

Table A-10: *OLS models of voter recall as a function of political engagement, Republicans only. In each model, the dependent variable is the index of recall.* $^*p<0.05$.

	Thomas			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Actual nominee agreement	0.08*	0.11*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement	0.05*	0.05*	0.18*	0.20*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	2,584	1,744	2,584	1,744
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.16
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Sotomayor and Kagan			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
Actual nominee agreement	0.33*	0.31*	0.14*	0.10*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement	0.16*	0.14*	0.61*	0.62*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
N	7,162	6,561	58,375	6,474
R^2	0.38	0.41	0.57	0.59
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-11: *OLS regressions of voters' perceptions of nominee vote and party of senator, Democrats only. In each model the dependent variable is perceived nominee agreement.* $^*p<0.05$.

	Thomas			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Actual nominee agreement	0.12*	0.13*	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Actual party agreement	0.03	0.02	0.20*	0.22*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N	2,138	1,624	2,138	1,624
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.16
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Sotomayor and Kagan			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
Actual nominee agreement	0.49*	0.47*	0.10*	0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement	0.13*	0.08*	0.75*	0.70*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
N	6,700	6,277	56,571	6,277
R^2	0.52	0.54	0.74	0.74
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-12: *OLS regressions of voters' perceptions of nominee vote and party of senator, Republicans only. In each model the dependent variable is perceived nominee agreement.*

	Approval		**Vote choice**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Thomas		
Actual nominee agreement	0.010	0.004	0.070*	0.067*
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Actual party agreement	0.044*	0.038*	0.219*	0.210*
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.023)
N	1,752	1,222	504	367
R^2	0.013	0.023	0.234	0.307
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Sotomayor and Kagan		***Kagan***	
Actual nominee agreement	0.129*	0.104*	0.088*	0.080*
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.026)
Actual party agreement	0.183*	0.157*	0.370*	0.380*
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.028)
N	53,455	5,953	7,923	713
R^2	0.300	0.289	0.775	0.842
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-13: *OLS regression models of reduced form of actual agreement versus evaluation of senators, Democrats only. The dependent variable in* ***Columns (1)-(2)****, whether respondents approve of their senators, while* ***Columns (3)-(4)*** *employ vote choice as the dependent variable. *$p<0.05$.*

	Approval		Vote choice	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Thomas		
Actual nominee agreement	0.021	0.028*	0.036	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Actual party agreement	0.033*	0.021	0.151*	0.095*
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.028)
N	1,499	1,150	449	369
R^2	0.010	0.042	0.106	0.157
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Sotomayor and Kagan		***Kagan***	
Actual nominee agreement	0.122*	0.101*	0.101*	0.101*
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.026)
Actual party agreement	0.240*	0.200*	0.377*	0.308*
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.031)
N	53,957	5,997	8,085	764
R^2	0.446	0.478	0.832	0.809
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-14: *OLS regression models of reduced form of actual agreement versus evaluation of senators, Republicans only. The dependent variable in* ***Columns (1)-(2)****, whether respondents approve of their senators, while* ***Columns (3)-(4)*** *employ vote choice as the dependent variable.* $^*p<0.05$.

	Approval		Vote choice	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Thomas		
Perceived nominee agreement	-0.015	-0.036	0.643	0.727
	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.722)	(0.962)
Perceived party agreement	0.208*	0.166*	0.486*	0.379
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.121)	(0.200)
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	1,752	1,222	504	367
F-stat for strong instrument (nominee)	12.1*	13.0*	1.67	1.88
F-stat for strong instrument (party)	106.2*	88.0*	170.7*	134.8*
	Sotomayor and Kagan		***Kagan***	
Perceived nominee agreement	0.274*	0.263*	0.063	0.074
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Perceived party agreement	0.191*	0.174*	0.456*	0.458*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	6278	5851	753	703
F-stat for strong instrument (nominee)	1,373.5*	819.4*	414.9*	238.0*
F-stat for strong instrument (party)	3,750.7 *	2,207.1*	1,806.4*	828.2*

Table A-15: *Instrumental variable models evaluating whether perceptions about nominee votes affect evaluation of senators, Democrats only. The table presents regressions of:* ***Columns (1)-(2)****, whether respondents approve of their senators on perceived nominee and party agreement;* ***Columns (3)-(4)****, whether respondents voted to re-elect their incumbent senator.* $^*p<0.05$.

	Approval		Vote choice	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Thomas		
Perceived nominee agreement	0.136	0.178	1.116	0.376
	(0.088)	(0.097)	(2.671)	(1.207)
Perceived party agreement	0.122*	0.056	0.350*	0.217*
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.082)
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	1,499	1,150	449	369
F-stat for strong instrument (nominee)	16.5839*	11.7334*	0.130585	0.165147
F-stat for strong instrument (party)	90.6315*	63.184*	139.73*	83.8296*
	Sotomayor and Kagan		***Kagan***	
Perceived nominee agreement	0.172*	0.160*	0.114*	0.101*
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Perceived party agreement	0.287*	0.254*	0.408*	0.365*
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	6,255	5,877	780	747
F-stat for strong instrument (nominee)	2,553.3*	1,039.4*	890.5*	246.4*
F-stat for strong instrument (party)	8975.6 *	2,080.2*	2,953.4*	451.6*

Table A-16: *Instrumental variable models evaluating whether perceptions about nominee votes affect evaluation of senators, Republicans only. The table presents regressions of:* ***Columns (1)-(2)****, whether respondents approve of their senators on perceived nominee and party agreement;* ***Columns (3)-(4)****, whether respondents voted to re-elect their incumbent senator. Models with control variables include: education, gender, race, age, and the factor score of political engagement based on the variables in Figures 4 and 5. The F-statistics are tests of whether actual nominee and party agreement is a sufficiently strong predictor of perceived nominee and party agreement, respectively. *$p<0.05$.*

A.6.4 Separate results for Sotomayor and Kagan

In this section we break out the results from our pooled analyses of Sotomayor and Kagan, and report them separately for each nominee.

- Table A-17 replicates Table 1.
- Table A-18 replicates Table 2.
- Table A-19 replicates Table 3.
- Table A-20 replicates Table 4.
- Table A-21 replicates Table 6 (recall we can only estimate the vote choice models on Kagan).

All the results are quite similar for the two nominees, although correct recall is slightly higher for Kagan.

Finally, Table A-22 replicates the additional recall analysis we did above, but this time breaks down results separately for Sotomayor and Kagan

References

Angrist, Joshua D and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2014. *Mastering 'metrics: The Path from Cause to Efffect*. Princeton University Press.

	Distribution of Index of Correct Responses			
	Sotomayor		**Kagan**	
	All respondents	Dropping DKs	All respondents	Dropping DKs
Recall neither	43%	3%	40%	2%
Recall one	15%	12%	13%	8%
Recall both	43%	85%	47%	90%
	Correct Responses by Party-Line Voting			
	Sotomayor		**Kagan**	
Percent correct (all respondents)	91%		94%	
Percent correct when senator votes with party	93%		95%	
Percent correct when senator votes against party	65%		75%	

Table A-17: *Measuring voter recall of senator votes. The top portion of the table uses the wide data to depict the distribution of the nominee-recall index, both with and without respondents who did not provide a response. The bottom part of the tables uses the long data to compare the responses of voters who senators voted with the majority of the party and those who voted against the majority of the party.*

	Sotomayor		Kagan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political engagement	0.44*	0.41*	0.46*	0.39*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.52*	0.68*	0.56*	0.58*
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,409	2,409	4,902	4,902
R^2	0.23	0.28	0.25	0.29

Table A-18: *OLS models of voter recall as a function of political engagement, Sotomayor and Kagan separately. In each model, the dependent variable is the index of recall. *p<0.05.*

	Sotomayor			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Actual nominee agreement	0.40*	0.37*	0.08*	0.08*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement	0.16*	0.10*	0.67*	0.63*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	5,304	4,739	25,436	4,790
R^2	0.42	0.45	0.63	0.63
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Kagan			
	DV: Perceived nominee agreement		DV: Perceived party agreement	
Actual nominee agreement	0.42*	0.41*	0.10*	0.08*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Actual party agreement	0.16*	0.10*	0.70*	0.69*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
N	10,499.00	9,717.00	105,122	9,595.00
R^2	0.49	0.52	0.68	0.70
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table A-19: *OLS regressions of voters' perceptions of nominee vote and party of senator, Sotomayor and Kagan separately. In each model the dependent variable is perceived nominee agreement. *p<0.05.*

	Sotomayor		***Kagan***	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Actual nominee agreement	0.118*	0.096*	0.141*	0.128*
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Actual party agreement	0.217*	0.165*	0.216*	0.168*
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Control variables?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	23,315	4,403	97,347	8,963
R^2	0.32	0.35	0.39	0.42

Table A-20: *OLS regression models of reduced form of actual agreement versus approval of senators, Sotomayor and Kagan separately. (The vote choice regressions only feature Kagan, so we do not duplicate those here). *p<0.05.*

	(1)	(2)
	Sotomayor	
Perceived nominee agreement	0.22*	0.21*
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Perceived party agreement	0.25*	0.21*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Control variables?	No	Yes
N	4,748	4,305
F-stat for strong instrument (nominee)	1,392.3*	594.2*
F-stat for strong instrument (party)	3,206.1*	1,269.9*
	Kagan	
Perceived nominee agreement	0.27*	0.25*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Perceived party agreement	0.22*	0.20*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Control variables?	No	Yes
N	9,418	8,824
F-stat for strong instrument (nominee)	3,683.8*	1,640.7*
F-stat for strong instrument (party)	10,310.0 *	3,870.8*

Table A-21: *Instrumental variable models evaluating whether perceptions about nominee votes affect approval of senators, Sotomayor and Kagan separately. (Recall the vote choice analysis was based solely on Kagan.) The F-statistics are tests of whether actual nominee and party agreement is a sufficiently strong predictor of perceived nominee and party agreement, respectively. Standard errors clustered on respondents.* $^*p<0.05$.

	Distribution of Index of Correct Responses					
	Thomas		**Sotomayor**		**Kagan**	
	Actual Index	Counterfactual	Actual Index	Counterfactual	Actual Index	Counterfactual
Recall neither	25%	24%	3%	20%	2%	21%
Recall one	36%	51%	12%	45%	8%	47%
Recall both	39%	26%	85%	35 %	90%	32 %

Table A-22: *Measuring voter recall of senator votes under the hypothetical distribution where voters make guesses based on the observed proportion of yes votes in the Senate. The actual index reports the distribution of the recall index after excluding respondents who are not willing to offer an opinon when they don't have one.*

Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shiro Kuriwaki. 2021*a*. "Congressional Representation: Accountability from the Constituent's Perspective.". *American Journal of Political Science*. Available at `https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12607`.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shiro Kuriwaki. 2021*b*. "Supporting Information for 'Congressional Representation: Accountability from the Constituent's Perspective'.". *American Journal of Political Science*. Available at `https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/downloadSupplement?doi=10.1111%2Fajps.12607&file=ajps12607-sup-0001-Appendix.pdf`.

Badas, Alex and Elizabeth Simas. 2020. "The Supreme Court as an Electoral Issue: Evidence from Three Studies." University of Houston working paper.

Cinelli, Carlos and Chad Hazlett. 2020. "Making Sense of Sensitivity: Extending Omitted Variable Bias." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology)* 82(1):39–67.

Cinelli, Carlos, Jeremy Ferwerda and Chad Hazlett. 2020. "sensemakr: Sensitivity Analysis Tools for OLS in R and Stata." available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3588978.