
POL 542
Field Seminar on American Political Institutions
Princeton University
Department of Politics
Spring 2019

Monday 1:30pm-4:20pm
 Fisher 200

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Introduction

This class is an entry - level graduate class into the study of U.S. political institutions. The class aims to provide an overview of the field and a foundation upon which students can begin to teach themselves additional works in this literature. In addition, the class hopes to build students' ability to conduct scholarly research, evaluate others' scholarship, and offer some professionalization in terms of learning the appropriate behavior of discussants and reviewers. There are no formal prerequisites, but we will not shy away from discussing models and statistical methods/results given that many of the major works use such techniques. Prior or concurrent exposure to these methods will be beneficial. All that is required, however, is a willingness to engage carefully and thoughtfully with the readings.

While the class is squarely on American politics, many of the concepts will apply to related questions in international relations and comparative politics, and class discussions will welcome those sorts of linkages. The class will be a lecture/seminar format. Some weeks are going to be heavier on the lecture component because it involves concepts that you have yet to cover in your coursework. Others will involve more discussion.

Course Requirements

The requirements of course include class participation, written assignments that ask students to analyze the readings, a class presentation, and a final exam.

The breakdown of students' final grade is as follows:

Class Participation: 35%
 Short Assignments: 20%

Class Presentation: 10%

Final Exam: 35%

Class participation

In each class we will aim to clarify and probe the puzzles, theories, methods, and evidence presented in the readings and to assess the contributions they make to an understanding of American politics. Preparation for and active participation in our weekly discussions is of the utmost importance. You should expect to be called on at any time, to discuss any reading in any session. Preparation involves more than just doing the readings, but coming to class having thought about the material and having organized your thoughts. Each week, you should bring questions and points to discuss. The following questions, while not exhaustive, may help you organize your thoughts on each reading:

1. What theoretical perspective does the study use or advocate? What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the theory? How does it compare to and contrast with alternative perspectives?
2. What method and research design does the study use (sample survey; field experiment; lab experiment; survey experiment; content analysis; formal modeling; etc.)? What are the pros and cons of this design for the research question? How might the study's conclusion change if it used a different research design?
3. What are the key implications of the study's findings for American political institutions?
4. How do the assumptions and results compare with those of related works? What is the source of any contradictions with other related studies?

Short papers

Each student will write four short papers. The papers will fall into two categories. The first category will involve a specific question based on that week's reading. These assignments will coincide with Week 4 (Feb. 25th) and Week 7 (April 1st). The assignments will be distributed to students the week before they are due.

The second category involves open-ended response papers. Each student will write two papers during weeks of their choosing. The exceptions are Week 1 (Feb. 1st), Week 4 (March 4th) and Week 7 (April 1st); response papers cannot be written during these weeks.

The goal of the papers, which should be in the range of 5-7 double-spaced pages, is to critically analyze that week's readings from the perspective of theory, logic, design, method, or evidence, assessing conclusions, relationships to other works, or contribution to the development of political science. You may choose to focus on one or more of the readings. High quality papers will avoid summarization and instead present critical analysis of most or all of that week's readings (you should not just pick at smaller points within one article). You are welcome to incorporate additional readings beyond the required readings for a given week, but you are not expected to do so.

Papers of either type must be emailed to both professors by **10 a.m.** the day of class.

Class Presentations

Each student will be expected to comment/discuss one paper during the semester. Sign-ups will occur in the second week of class.

Final exam

The final will be a take-home exam given over the reading and exam period. The goal of the exam will be to simulate the conditions of the written component of the American Politics general exam. More information about the exam will be provided toward the end of the semester.

Class Readings and Schedule

Articles Unless otherwise noted, you are responsible for finding all articles online. Articles marked with a **[BB]** are available on Blackboard, either in “Course Materials” or “E-Reserves.”

Books The following books have been placed on reserve. You may wish to purchase some or all of these; if you are planning on taking the general exam in American Politics, it may be worth the investment (particularly if you can find cheap used copies online).

- Arnold, R. Douglas, *Congress and the Bureaucracy*
- Arnold, R. Douglas, *The Logic of Congressional Action*
- Berry, Christopher. *Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments*
- Cameron, Charles, *Veto Bargaining*
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy Making and the American Public.*
- Cox, Gary & Mathew McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda*
- Howell, William. *Power without Persuasion.*
- Krehbiel, Keith, *Information and Legislative Organization.*
- Krehbiel, Keith, *Pivotal Politics*
- Lee, Frances. 2009. *Beyond Ideology*
- Lee, Frances. 2016. *Insecure Majorities*
- Lewis, David E, *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance.*
- Mayhew, David R., *Congress: The Electoral Connection.*
- Powell, Lynda. 2012. *The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures.*
- Skowronek, Stephen, *The Politics Presidents Make.*
- Wilson, James Q., *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*

A Note on the Readings

Choosing readings for a field survey is something of a subjective enterprise, as it is impossible to cover any (or most) of the important works on a given topic in a single week. For each week, the goal of the readings is to expose you to the most important books and articles that provide a contour of the relevant debate(s). Where possible, we have also added relatively recent papers in order to provide you with a sense of what the “cutting edge” looks like, for a given topic.

The upshot is that *you should not treat the required readings as* exhaustive, in any sense. For topics you are particularly interested in, we would strongly encourage you to take a look at the recommended readings—either concurrently with the required readings, time permitting, or whenever you have time. (Articles from the *Annual Review of Politics* are often very valuable for providing critical syntheses of literatures.) These readings are largely drawn from the American Politics general exam reading list, which we encourage you to consult. We’ve made the list available at http://www.princeton.edu/~jkastell/American_Politics_field_list_2009.pdf . Note that (unfortunately) the list was last updated in 2009, so it obviously does not include any research published since then.

Schedule of Classes

Please note that we will not hold class on March 25th; that day is the first day of the campus visit for prospective graduate students. We will schedule a makeup class for the end of the semester, probably during the week after the last class of the semester.

- **Week 1 (2/4):** Why study institutions? And how?
- **Week 2 (2/11):** Congress: The Electoral Connection
- **Week 3 (2/18):** Congress: Committees
- **Week 4 (2/25):** Congress: Parties
- **Week 5 (3/4):** Lawmaking and the Separation of Powers
- **Week 6 (3/11):** Presidency: Presidents and Legislative Influence
- **Spring Break:** No Class (3/18)
- **Grad Recruitment:** No Class (3/25)
- **Week 7 (4/1):** Presidency II: Presidents and Policy Choices
- **Week 8 (4/8):** Bureaucracy: Bureaucrats’ Incentives
- **Week 9 (4/15):** Bureaucracy: Delegation
- **Week 10 (4/22):** Interest Groups and Political Parties as Institutions
- **Week 11 (4/29):** Courts and the Separation of Powers
- **Week 12 (TBD):** State and Local Political Institutions

Week 1. Why study institutions? And how?

Required

- Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 15:123-144
- Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review*. 74:432-46 [The paper Diermeier and Krehbiel argue against. If you're taking game theory, the argument here will become clearer in a few weeks.]
- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2007. "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. Rhodes, Binder and Rockman.
- Elizabeth Sanders. 2007. "Historical Institutionalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. Rhodes, Binder and Rockman.

Recommended

- Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies*. XLIV:936-57 [Overlaps with Shepsle and Sanders, but still useful]
- Ordeshook, Peter C. "Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.'" *American Political Science Review*.
- Charles Cameron, "What is Political Science?" and "The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations," in *A Quantitative Tour of the Social Sciences*, ed. Andrew Gelman and Jeronimo Cortina, pp. 207-241(Blackboard) [Written for undergraduates, but provides a great overview of the research process.]
- Adam Przeworski. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition*. 39(2): 527-540
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass C. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, ch. 1-2.
- Timothy Besley and Anne Case. 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41:7-73

Week 2. Congress: The Electoral Connection

Required

- Mayhew. 1974. *The Electoral Connection*. “Introduction” and “The Electoral Incentive.”
- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. Chapters 1-4.
- Fenno, Richard. 1977. “U.S. House Members and their Constituencies: An Exploration.” *APSR*
- Lee, Moretti, and Butler. 2004. “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan. 2002. “Out of Step, Out of Office” *American Political Science Review*.

Recommended

- Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). [Strongly recommended and assigned later in the course]
- Adam Bonica and Gary W. Cox (2018), "Ideological Extremists in the U.S. Congress: Out of Step but Still in Office", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*: Vol. 13: No. 2, pp 207-236.
- Rothenberg, Lawrence, Gary Hollibaugh and Kristin Rulison, “Does it Really Hurt to be Out of Step?” *Political Research Quarterly* 66 (2013): 856-867
- Thomsen, Danielle M. 2017. *Opting Out of Congress: Partisan Polarization and the Decline of Moderate Candidates*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hutchings, V.L., H. McClerking, and G. Charles, 2004. “Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the Importance of Stability.” *Journal of Politics* 66(2): p. 450-468.
- Fenno, Jr., Richard. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (1978).
- Carson and Jenkins. “Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time.” *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Ansolabehere, S. and Jones, P.E., 2010. Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3), pp.583-597.
- Casellas, Jason. 2011. *Latino Representation in State Houses and Congress*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ashworth. 2012. “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work.”
- Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. “Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?” *AJPS*, Vol. 40, No. 2. (May, 1996), pp. 478-497.
- Miller, Warren and Donald Stokes, 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress,” *APSR*.
- Ferejohn. 1986. “Incumbent performance and Electoral Control” *Public Choice*
- Grimmer, Messing and Westwood. 2012. “How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation.” *APSR*

- Grimmer, Justin. 2013. "Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Grimmer, Justin. 2013. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters*. Cambridge University Press

Week 3. Congress: Committees

Required

- David Mayhew. *The Electoral Connection*. “Processes and Policies.”
- Weingast, Barry and William J. Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Krehbiel. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. 1-3
- Shepsle and Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power” *American Political Science Review*.
 - a. And subsequent exchange by Krehbiel. “Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?” *American Political Science Review*

Recommended

- Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,” *APSR*.
- Fenno, Jr., Richard. *Congressmen in Committees* (1973).
- Baron, David and John Ferejohn. “Bargaining in Legislatures,” *APSR*, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Dec., 1989), pp. 1181-1206.
- Damian Cann. 2008. *Sharing the Wealth*. Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6.
- Anzia, Sarah F., and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 478-493.
- Berry, Christopher and Andrew Fowler. 2015. “Cardinals or Clerics: Committees and the Distribution of Pork.” *American Journal of Political Science*.
 - (But note critique from Ben Hammond and Leah Rosenstiel).
- Grimmer, Justin and Eleanor Neff Powell. 2013. “Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal.” *Journal of Politics* 75(4): 907-920.

Week 4. Congress: Parties

Required

- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. Chapters 1-2
- John Aldrich and David Rohde. 2000. "One D is Not Enough: Measuring Conditional Party Government." *Working paper [BB]*
- Cox & McCubbins. 2007. *Setting the Agenda*. Chs. 2, 3 & 5.
- Joshua Clinton. 2012. "Using Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Frances Lee, *Beyond Ideology*, Chs. 1 and 3
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Recommended

- APSA. 1950. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System."
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* Cox, Gary and Mathew D. McCubbins. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (1993).
- Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (1997).
- Snyder and Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *AJPS*
- Gailmard, Sean and Jeff Jenkins. 2007. "Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House." *Journal of Politics*.
- Steven Smith. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. Cambridge University Press.
- Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich. 1997. "Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House." *AJPS*
- "Parties in Elections, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias," Keith Krehbiel, Adam Meirowitz and Thomas Romer. *Political Analysis* 2005, 13(2):113-138.5.
- Iaryczower, Matias., 2008. Contestable leadership: Party leaders as principals and agents. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 3(3), pp.203-225.
- James M. Snyder, Jr. and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 90-110.
- McCarty et al. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline." *APSR*
- Josh Clinton. 2007. "Lawmaking and Roll Calls." *Journal of Politics*.
- Powell & Butler. 2014. "Understanding the Party Brand: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Valence." *Journal of Politics*
- Thomsen, Danielle M. 2015. "Why So Few (Republican) Women? Explaining the Partisan Imbalance of Women in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40(2): 295-323.
- Eleanor Powell. 2019. *Where Money Matters in Congress: A Window into How Parties Evolve* (Cambridge University Press)

Week 5. Lawmaking and the Separation of Powers

Required

- Mayhew. 1991. *Divided We Govern*. Chapters 1, 3-5
- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. Chapter 3
- Sarah Binder. 1999. “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96.” *APSR*.
- Josh Clinton. 2012. “Congress, Lawmaking, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1971–2000” *AJPS*.
- Frances Lee. 2016. *Insecure Majorities*. Chapters 1 & 3.

Recommended

- Fiorina, Morris P. *Divided Government*. Allyn & Bacon, 1996.
- Coleman, John J., 1999. Unified government, divided government, and party responsiveness. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4), pp.821-835.
- Kirkland, Patricia, and Justin Phillips. 2018. “Is Divided Government a Cause of Legislative Delay?”. 2018. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 13(2): 173-206.
- Howell, W., Adler, S., Cameron, C. and Riemann, C., 2000. Divided government and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945-94. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, pp.285-312.
- Binder. *Statemate*
- Binder. 2015. “The Dysfunctional Congress.” *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Fang-Yi Chiou, Lawrence Rothenberg. 2003. “When Pivotal Politics Meet Partisan Politics.” *American Journal of Political Science* 503-522 47(3): 503-522.
- Ansolabehere S, Palmer M, Schneer B. “Divided government and significant legislation: A History of Congress from 1789 to 2010.” *Social Science History*. 2018;42 (1) :81-108.
- Joshua Clinton & John Lapinski. 2005. “Measuring Legislative Accomplishment, 1877–1994”. *AJPS*

Week 6. Presidency: Presidents and Legislative Influence

- McCarty, Nolan. "Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?" *Journal of Politics* 71: 369-384.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chapters 1-3.
- Neustadt. *Presidential Power*. 1990 Edition. Chs. 1 and 3. [E-Reserves]
- Cameron. *Veto Bargaining*. Chapters 4 and 6 (Recommended purchase, but also on E-reserves).
- Rogowski, Jon C. 2016. "Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance." *American Political Science Review*.

Recommended

- King, Gary. "The Methodology of Presidential Research." *Researching the Presidency*. ed. Michael Nelson. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Howell. 2011. "Presidential Power in War." *Annual Review of Political Science*
- Rudalevige, Andrew. *Managing the President's Program. Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formation*. (2002)
- Wildavsky, Aaron. "The Two Presidencies," *Transaction* 4 (December, 1966), pp. 7-14.
- Canes-Wrone, Howell & Lewis. 2008. "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis." *JOP*.
- Berry, C.R., Burden, B.C. and Howell, W.G., 2010. The president and the distribution of federal spending. *American Political Science Review*, 104(4), pp.783-799.

Week 7. Presidency II: Presidents and Policy Choices

Required

- Moe, Terry. "The Politicized Presidency." 1985. In *The New Direction in American Politics*, edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (1985). [BB]
- Howell. *Power Without Persuasion*. Chapters 2 and 4
- Bolton, Alex and Sharece Thrower. 2015. "Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chapters 5, 7
- Steven Skowronek. 1997. *The Politics Presidents Make*. Chapters 1-3

Recommended

- Groseclose, Timothy and Nolan McCarty. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," *AJPS*. 45 (2000), pp. 100-119.
- Thrower, Sharece. 2017. "To Revoke or Not Revoke?: The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 642 - 656.
- Baum, Matthew and Sam Kernell. 1999. "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *APSR*.
- Edwards, George (2006). *On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit*.
- Rivers, Douglas, and Nancy Rose. "Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress," *AJPS* 29 (1985), pp.183-96.
- Tulis, Jeffrey. *The Rhetorical Presidency* (1998)
- Charles Cameron and Jee-Kwang Park. 2011. "Going Public When Opinion Is Contested: Evidence from Presidents' Campaigns for Supreme Court Nominees, 1930-2009." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.
- Jacobs and Shapiro. *Politicians Don't Pander*.

Week 8. Bureaucracy: Bureaucrats' Incentives

Required

- James Q. Wilson. Chapters. Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 8
- Dan Carpenter. 2000. *Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Chapters 1-3
- David Lewis. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance* (Princeton University Press, 2008). Chapters 1-4
- Sean Gailmard and John Patty. 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise." *American Journal of Political Science*
- Kenneth Lowande. 2019. "Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies" *Journal of Politics*

Recommended

- David E. Lewis. 2011. "Presidential Appointments and Personnel." *Annual Review of Political Science*
- Gordon. 2011. "Politicizing Agency Spending Authority: Lessons from a Bush-era Scandal." *APSR*
- Potter, Rachel. 2017. "Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking." *Journal of Politics*. 79(3): 841-855.
- Lowi, Theodore. *The End of Liberalism* (1979).
- Weber, Max. *Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy, and Religion : A Selection of Texts* (1986).
- Mike Ting. "A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies." *AJPS* 2002.
- Graham Allison. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *APSR*
- Bendor and Hammond. "Rethinking Allison's Models." *APSR* (1992).
- Gailmard, S. and Patty, J.W., 2012. *Learning while governing: Expertise and Accountability in the executive branch*. University of Chicago Press.

Week 9. Bureaucracy: Delegation

Required

- Bendor et al. 2001. "Theories of Delegation." *Annual Review of Political Science*
- McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1983. "Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms." *AJPS*.
- McNollgast. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *JLEO*.
- Terry Moe. 1991. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In *Can the Government Govern?* [BB]
- Clinton, J.D., Lewis, D.E. and Selin, J.L., 2014. Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2), pp.387-401.

Recommended

- Doug Arnold. 1979. *Congress and the Bureaucracy*. Chapters 1, 7 and 9.
- McCann, Pamela, 2015. "The Strategic Use of Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation." *Journal of Politics*, 77(3), 620-634.
- Jon Bendor and Adam Meirowitz. "Spatial Models of Delegation." *APSR*. 2004.
- Gailmard and Patty. 2012. "Formal Models of Bureaucracy." *Annual Review of Political Science*
- Huber, John D. and Charles Shipan. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (2002).
- Weingast, Barry and Mark Moran. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," *Journal of Political Economy* 91 (1983), pp. 765-800.
- McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast. "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies." *Virginia Law Review* 75 (1989), pp. 431-82.
- Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on the Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6. pp. 1-21.
- Epstein & O'Halloran. 1997. *Delegating Powers*.

Week 10. Interest Groups and Political Parties as Institutions

- Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands, and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3):671-597.
- McCarty, N. and Schickler, E., 2018. On the Theory of Parties. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21, pp.175-193.
- Snyder, James M., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science*. 46(1): 90-110.
- Mancur Olson, 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Sarah F. Anzia, 2019. "When Does a Group of Citizens Influence Policy? Evidence from Senior Citizen Participation in City Politics," *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (January 2019): 1-14. (Available on-line <https://doi.org/10.1086/699916>)

Required

- Dan Gillion. 2013. *The Political Power of Protest: Minority Activism and Shifts in Public Policy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Strolovitch, Dara. 2007. *Affirmative Advocacy: Race, Class, and Gender in Interest Group Politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Aldrich. 1995. *Why Parties?*
- Cohen, M., Karol, D., Noel, H. and Zaller, J., 2008. *The Party Decides*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hetherington, Marc. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *APSR*
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2016. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology Unequal Riches 2nd Edition*, Chapters 1-3
- McCarty et al. 2009. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?" *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Fiorina, Morris P. *Disconnect: The Breakdown in American Politics*. University of Oklahoma Press. Chapters 1, 4-6.
- David A Bateman, Joshua Clinton, and John Lapinski. 2015. "A House Divided? Roll Calls, Polarization, and Policy Differences in the US House, 1877–2011." *AJPS*
- Bafumi and Herron. 2010. "Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress." *APSR*
- McCarty and Barber. 2013. "The Policy Consequences of Partisan Polarization in the United States."
- Layman et al. 2006. "Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes and Consequences." *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Fiorina and Abrams. 2008. "Political Polarization in the American Public." *Annual Review*

of Political Science.

- Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. "The Polarization of American Politics," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 4. (Nov., 1984), pp. 1061-1079.
- Paul Quirk. 2011. "A House Dividing: Understanding Polarization." *The Forum*

Week 11. Courts and the Separation of Powers

Required

- Segal and Spaeth. 2002. *The Supreme Court and Attitudinal Model Revisited*. Chapters 1-3. [BB] (skim Ch. 2)
- Paul Frymer. 2003. "Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85" *American Political Science Review*.
- Whittington, Keith, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand': Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court," *American Political Science Review* 99 (583-96).
- Tom Clark. 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court-curbing and Judicial Legitimacy," *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Cameron, Charles. and Kastellec, Jonathan P. 2016. "Are Supreme Court Nominations a Move-the-Median Game?" *American Political Science Review*, 110(4), pp.778-797

Recommended

- Dahl, Robert. 1957. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy-Maker" *Journal of Public Law*.
- Rosenberg, Gerald. 1991. *The Hollow Hope*.
- Baum, Larry. 2003. "The Supreme Court in American Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Frymer, Paul, *Black and Blue*,
- Whittington. 2007. *The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy*
- Howard Gillman, "How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891," *APSR* 96 (2002)
- Shep Melnick, *Between the Lines*
- Iaryczower, Matias, and Matthew Shum. "The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, Keep it Tight." *American Economic Review* 102 (2012): 202-237.
- Epstein, Landers, and Posner. 2013. *The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice*.
- Beim, Deborah. 2017. "Learning in the Judicial Hierarchy." *Journal of Politics* 79(2).

Week 12. State and Local Political Institutions

Required

- Chris Berry. *Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments*, pp. 1-107.
- Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose. 2011 “Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits.” *Journal of Politics*.
- Shor and McCarty. 2011. *APSR*. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.”
- Lynda Powell. 2012. *The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures*. Chapters 1, 2, and 6.
- Lax and Phillips. 2012. “The Democratic Deficit in the States.” *AJPS*

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