@misc{149866,
  author = {Jonathan Kastellec},
  title = {Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals},
  abstract = { Do hierarchical politics in the federal judiciary shape collegial politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and thus influence judicial voting and case outcomes? I develop a model in which the political control of the dual layer of hierarchy above three-judge panels---full circuits and the Supreme Court---affects the ability of a single Democratic or Republican judge on a three-judge panel to influence two colleagues from the opposing party. The theory predicts that panel majorities should be more strongly influenced by a single judge of the opposing party--a {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}counter-judge"--when that judge is aligned with the Supreme Court. Examining thousands of judicial votes in multiple issue areas, I show that the effect of adding a counter-judge to a panel is indeed asymmetric, and varies based on hierarchical alignment. The interaction of hierarchical and collegial politics increases the Supreme Court{\textquoteright}s control of the judicial hierarchy and helps promotes the rule of law. },
  year = {2011},
  journal = {The Journal of Politics},
  volume = {73},
  pages = {345{\textendash}361},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press New York, USA},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0PTKDP},
  language = {eng},
}