@misc{149851,
  author = {Jonathan Kastellec},
  title = {Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the U.S. Courts of Appeals},
  abstract = { This paper integrates the literatures on judicial compliance, panel decision making and case selection in the federal judiciary hierarchy. Many studies have speculated that {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}panel effects" -- the phenomena under which an individual judge{\textquoteright}s vote may depend on her colleagues on a three-judge panel -- can be tied to a {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}whistleblower effect," through which a lower court judge can constrain a panel majority from disobeying with Supreme Court precedent by threatening to dissent. However, no study has systematically found such a relationship. I present a game-theoretic model of circuit court-Supreme Court interaction that demonstrates how panel composition might affect the likelihood of lower court compliance to Supreme Court doctrine. The model illustrates how three-judge panels, while not inducing perfect doctrinal control of lower courts by the Supreme Court, significantly increases the latter{\textquoteright}s ability to see its preferred doctrine carried out by its subordinates in the judicial hierarchy. },
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, \& Organization},
  volume = {23},
  pages = {421{\textendash}441},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  language = {eng},
}